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Despite the popularity of Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) in a wide range of industries, two
well-known shortcomings are the complexity of the FMEA worksheet and its intricacy of use. To the best
of our knowledge, the use of computation techniques for solving the aforementioned shortcomings is
limited. As such, the idea of clustering and visualization pertaining to the failure modes in FMEA is
proposed in this paper. A neural network visualization model with an incremental learning feature,
i.e., the evolving tree (ETree), is adopted to allow the failure modes in FMEA to be clustered and visualized
as a tree structure. In addition, the ideas of risk interval and risk ordering for different groups of failure
modes are proposed to allow the failure modes to be ordered, analyzed, and evaluated in groups. The
main advantages of the proposed method lie in its ability to transform failure modes in a complex
FMEA worksheet to a tree structure for better visualization, while maintaining the risk evaluation and
ordering features. It can be applied to the conventional FMEA methodology without requiring additional
information or data. A real world case study in the edible bird nest industry in Sarawak (Borneo Island) is
used to evaluate the usefulness of the proposed method. The experiments show that the failure modes in
FMEA can be effectively visualized through the tree structure. A discussion with FMEA users engaged in
the case study indicates that such visualization is helpful in comprehending and analyzing the respective
failure modes, as compared with those in an FMEA table. The resulting tree structure, together with risk
interval and risk ordering, provides a quick and easily understandable framework to elucidate important
information from complex FMEA forms; therefore facilitating the decision-making tasks by FMEA users.
The significance of this study is twofold, viz., the use of a computational visualization approach to tackling
two well-known shortcomings of FMEA; and the use of ETree as an effective neural network learning
paradigm to facilitate FMEA implementations. These findings aim to spearhead the potential adoption
of FMEA as a useful and usable risk evaluation and management tool by the wider community.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction (Keskin & Özkan, 2009), as well as k-means (Chang et al., 1998)Clustering is a process of organizing a set of data attributed by
multi-dimensional features into different groups based on a simi-
larity measure (Rui & Donald, 2009). Usually, each group of data
is represented by a unique weight vector, e.g. the centroid of the
group (Rui & Donald, 2009). Clustering methods are useful in many
applications, e.g. data mining (Lan, Frank, & Hall, 2005), data query
(Lan et al., 2005), robotic arm movements (Kohonen, Simula, &
Visa, 1996), noise reduction in telecommunication (Kohonen,
2001), and image segmentation (Chang, Luo, & Parker, 1998).
Examples of popular clustering methods include the
self-organizing map (SOM) (Vesanto & Alhoniemi, 2000), the evolv-
ing tree (ETree) (Pakkanen, Iivarinen, & Oja, 2006), fuzzy ARTand fuzzy c-means (Rezaee, Leliveldt, & Reiber, 1998) clustering
algorithms.
The SOM model is a neural network capable of mapping high
dimensional data samples onto a lower dimensional space and rep-
resenting them as nodes (Kohonen et al., 1996; Kohonen, 2001;
Vesanto & Alhoniemi, 2000). It also provides a topological view
of the underlying data structure (Kohonen et al., 1996; Kohonen,
2001; Vesanto & Alhoniemi, 2000). A number of enhanced
SOM models have been proposed, e.g. growing SOM (GSOM)
(Matharage, Alahakoon, Rajapakse, & Pin, 2011; Kuo, Wang, &
Chen, 2012), growing hierarchical SOM (GHSOM) (Huang & Tsaih,
2012), and ETree (Pakkanen, Iivarinen, & Oja, 2004, 2006). These
enhancements overcome two shortcomings of SOM, i.e., the
requirement of a pre-defined map size before learning (Kohonen,
2001; Vesanto & Alhoniemi, 2000) and the long learning time
when a large map size is initiated (Pakkanen et al., 2004, 2006).
GSOM starts with a small map, and nodes are added during the
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an incremental learning capability (Matharage et al., 2011).
GHSOM has a hierarchical architecture, whereby it has a
SOM-like adaptive architecture that builds various layers of hierar-
chy (Huang & Tsaih, 2012). For ETree, a tree structure is adopted
whereby nodes are allowed to grow freely when new data samples
are available (Pakkanen et al., 2004, 2006). The growing structure
of ETree is important for analyzing complex data structures, e.g.
in image clustering problems (Pakkanen et al., 2004, 2006). In
our preliminary investigation, ETree has been shown useful for
tackling textual document clustering problems (Chang, Tay, &
Lim, 2013, 2014). The ETree-based approach increases the flexibil-
ity of clustering by allowing new clusters to be formed and
updated, in response to new textual documents.
In this paper, the focus is on applying ETree to clustering and
visualization of failure modes with the Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis (FMEA) methodology. FMEA is an effective problem pre-
vention and risk analysis methodology for defining, identifying,
and eliminating failures of a system, design, process, or service
(Stamatis, 2003). It has been used in a wide variety of application
domains, e.g., aerospace (Bowles & Peláez, 1995), automotive
(Stamatis, 2003), nuclear (Guimarães & Lapa, 2004), electronic
(Zafiropoulos & Dialynas, 2005), manufacturing (Tay & Lim,
2006), chemical (Garrick, 1988), mechanical (Korayem & Iravani,
2008), healthcare and hospital (McNally, Page, & Sunderland,
1997), and agriculture (Jong, Tay, & Lim, 2013). FMEA identifies
the failure modes of a system or process, understands the causes
and effects of each failure mode, and determines suitable actions
to eliminate or reduce the risk of the respective failure modes
(Stamatis, 2003). Traditionally, the risk of a failure mode is deter-
mined by computing the Risk Priority Number (RPN) (Stamatis,
2003). The RPN model considers three factors as its inputs, i.e.
Severity (S), Occurrence (O), and Detection (D), and produces an
RPN score (i.e. multiplication of S, O, and D) as the output
(Stamatis, 2003). S and O are seriousness and frequency of a failure,
respectively, while D is the effectiveness of the existing measures
in detecting a failure before the effect of the failure reaches the
customer(s) (Stamatis, 2003).
While the effectiveness of FMEA has been demonstrated, the
traditional RPN model is susceptible to a number of limitations
(Bowles & Peláez, 1995; Tay & Lim, 2006; Liu, Liu, & Liu, 2013a).
Many risk evaluation methods which can be used as an alternative
to the traditional RPN model have been investigated. According to
the review by Liu et al. (2013a), the existing risk evaluation meth-
ods can be grouped into five categories, i.e., multi-criteria decision
making (MCDM) methods, mathematical programming methods,
artificial intelligence methods, integrated methods, and other
methods. Recently, a number of new methods for risk evaluation
and/or ranking have also been developed. Bozdag, Asan, Soyer,
and Serdarasan (2015) proposed an interval type-2 fuzzy set to
capture both intra-personal and inter-personal uncertainties.
Chang (2014) developed a soft set-based ranking technique for
the prioritization of failure modes. Du, Mo, Deng, Sadiq, and
Deng (2014) proposed a hybrid evidential reasoning (ER) and
TOPSIS ( Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal
Solution)-based method for group assessment in FMEA. ER was
used to express FMEA users’ assessments that contain imprecision
and uncertainty. TOPSIS was then used to aggregate the risk fac-
tors. Liu, Liu, and Lin (2013b) proposed a fuzzy ER and belief
rule-based method for risk evaluation and ranking. The Dempster
rule of combination was used to aggregate all relevant rules.
A number of new fuzzy sets related approaches have also been
reported. These include an intuitionistic fuzzy set method with the
weighted Euclidean distance (Liu, Liu, & Li, 2014a), a fuzzy
weighted average with fuzzy decision-making method (Liu, You,
Lin, & Li, 2014c), a fuzzy set theory and a multi-MOORA(multi-objective optimization by ratio analysis) method (Liu, Fan,
Li, & Chen, 2014e), a hybrid intuitionistic fuzzy-TOPSIS method
(Liu, You, Shan, & Shao, 2014f), and a hybrid fuzzy digraph and
matrix method (Liu, Chen, You, & Li, 2014h). Besides that, Liu,
You, Fan, and Lin (2014b) also proposed an D numbers and grey
relational projection method, in which the assessment results were
expressed in D numbers. Liu, Li, You, and Chen (2014d) presented
an FMEA method comprising interval 2-tuple linguistic variables
with gray relational analysis to capture FMEA users’ diverse opin-
ions. Liu, You, and You (2014g) proposed an interval 2-tuple hybrid
weighted distance measure –based method for risk evaluation. In
addition, a fuzzy SIRM (Single-Input-Rule-Module)-based RPN
model (Jong, Tay, & Lim, 2014) and a two-stage Sugeno
fuzzy-based RPN model with similarity reasoning (Jee, Tay, &
Lim, 2015) were also proposed.
In our previous research, fuzzy inference systems (Tay & Lim,
2006; Jong et al., 2013, 2014; Jee et al., 2015) and an adaptive clus-
tering method, i.e., fuzzy adaptive reasoning theory (Tay, Jong, &
Lim, 2015), have been applied to FMEA. Based on the findings, we
have proven the importance of maintaining the monotonicity rela-
tionship between inputs (S, O, D) and the output (RPN score) (Tay &
Lim, 2008a, 2008b; Jee et al., 2015). Our works (Tay & Lim, 2006;
Jong et al., 2013, 2014; Jee et al., 2015) focus on the development
of fuzzy inference system–based frameworks for risk evaluation,
with the aim of reducing the number of fuzzy rules while maintain-
ing the monotonicity property. Fuzzy ART was used by Keskin and
Özkan (2009) as a clustering method to tackle the problem whereby
different combinations of S, O, and D could produce the same RPN
scores. In addition to this reason, we further justify the advantages
of using clustering methods in FMEA, as follows: (1) clustering
deals with the original S, O, and D scores directly; (2) clustering
allows the failure modes to be compared and visualized in the input
space as groups of information; (3) the use of the original S, O, and D
scores (instead of the mapped S, O, and D scores into a common
domain) avoids loss of information or modification of important
information for decision making purposes.
In the literature, studies on combining clustering (sometime
together with visualization) and FMEA (or risk management) are
not new. Arunajadai, Uder, Stone, and Tumer (2004) proposed a
statistical clustering procedure to identify potential failures of
FMEA. A function-failure matrix that can be used as a knowledge
base to identify and analyze potential failures for new designs
and redesign as well as to allow grouping of the failure modes
was developed. The underlying principle was based on similarities
between different failure modes pertaining to the product/compo-
nent functionality. The resulting failure modes were then arranged
(or visualized) in a table according to their types and clusters. The
importance of grouping failure modes was again suggested by
Mandal and Maiti (2014) recently. They suggested the use of a sim-
ilarity to group failure modes that have similar risk levels. Besides
that, Romuald Iwańkowicz and Rosochacki (2014) used a cluster-
ing method to process and analyze a database of accidents and pre-
dict the process risk. Recently, Li, Chen, and Xiang (2015) proposed
a grey clustering-based indicator system to avoid the arbitrary
selection of indicators in risk management of an airport safety
evaluation program in China.
Studies on combining visualization and FMEA (or risk analysis
and management) are also available in the literature. Inoue and
Yamada (2010) visualized complicated processes in pharmaceuti-
cal research using FMEA. Grøndahl, Lund, and Stølen (2011) inves-
tigated how graphical effects (e.g., size, color, shape) and text
labels introduced in the CORAS risk modeling language affected
the understanding of the subject of interest. Wintle and
Nicholson (2014) used Bayesian networks as graphical modeling
tools for exploring what-if scenarios, visualizing systems and prob-
lems, and communicating with stakeholders during decision
W.L. Chang et al. / Expert Systems with Applications 42 (2015) 7235–7244 7237making. In risk analysis, the failure risks are at times visualized
with respect to the likelihood and impact (a.k.a. S) dimensions,
i.e., a two-dimensional space (Feather, Cornford, Kiper, &
Menzies, 2006). Such visualization is useful for understanding
the distribution of risks. However, the method is not applicable
to FMEA, which involves a three-dimensional input (i.e., S, O, and
D) space.
Building on the findings of our previous investigations
(Tay et al., 2015), the main aim of this paper is to examine the
use of the ETree for analyzing (i.e., both clustering and visualiza-
tion) of failure modes in FMEA, instead of just performing cluster-
ing only as in the use of fuzzy ART (Tay et al., 2015). To the best of
our knowledge, even though studies on synthesizing clustering
and/or visualization with FMEA is not new, little attention is
focused on clustering and visualization of the failure modes in
FMEA, as conducted in this paper. In addition, the method pre-
sented in this study is useful for tackling two other important
and practical issues related to FMEA implementation (Signor,
2002; Montgomery, Pugh, Leedham, & Twitchett, 1996), i.e., (1)
complexity of the FMEA worksheet; (2) intricacy of its use.
Entries in a FMEA worksheet are voluminous (Signor, 2002). An
example of an FMEA table (e.g. see Stamatis, 2003, pages
231-242) could take up to 11 pages. The FMEA worksheet is hard
to produce (Signor, 2002; Montgomery et al., 1996), hard to under-
stand and read, as well as hard to maintain (Signor, 2002;
Montgomery et al., 1996). From our literature research, limited
investigations on using computing techniques to solve the
aforementioned issues have been reported so far. As a result, we
incorporate visualization techniques into FMEA, in an attempt to
offer an effective solution for both aforementioned issues.
Visualization serves as a communication means between FMEA
and its users. A good visualization (or effective communication)
of the failure modes or corrective actions is important because
(1) it presents the failure modes or actions as a structure that is
easy to understand, as compared with the original failure modes
or actions in complex FMEA worksheets; (2) it allows users to
access or analyze FMEA with a large number of failure modes
and corrective actions quickly, which may not be otherwise
possible; (3) it provides users an overview of all failure modes
and corrective actions, which mitigates the problem in having a
good understanding and insight into the overall FMEA exercise
in situations where no visualization is available; (4) it leads to
more efficient processes for making decisions and taking actions.
Compared with other existing methods, our proposed method
does not focus on risk evaluation issues. Instead, we tackle issues
related to complexity of the FMEA worksheet and difficulties in
understanding and maintaining the FMEA table. The main advan-
tages of the proposed method lie in its ability to transform the
failure modes in a complicated FMEA worksheet to a tree structure
for better visualization, while maintaining the risk evaluation and
ordering features. The proposed method is applicable to the
conventional FMEA methodology without requiring additional
information or data. It can also be used with other existing meth-
ods, e.g., the fuzzy inference system–based RPN model (Bowles &
Peláez, 1995; Jee et al., 2015), for obtaining more accurate risk
evaluation and ordering outcomes. Nevertheless, one limitation
of the proposed method is that it requires consensus from FMEA
users with different expertise levels, in order to provide a meaning-
ful visualization covering all the S, O, and D scores.
In this study, ETree is chosen for its adaptive feature, flexibility
to grow or expand with new data samples, and ease of representa-
tion in the form of a tree for visualization and clustering purposes.
ETree is a type of neural network (Pakkanen et al., 2004; Pakkanen
et al., 2006), which can create its own organization of the informa-
tion it receives during learning. Such visualization is useful as it
provides a quick and easily understandable representation of theFMEA worksheet, which is usually complex and lengthy, to
facilitate decision making tasks. In this paper, we depict the
characteristics and relationship of the failure modes or actions in
a tree structure. Two concepts, i.e., risk interval and risk ordering
of clusters, are introduced to allow failure modes to be analyzed
in a group. To evaluate the proposed method, a real-world case
study from the edible bird nest (EBN) industry is used. The exper-
imental results show that the complicated and lengthy FMEA
worksheets pertaining to the EBN processes can be visualized as
comprehensible tree structures. From the discussion with FMEA
users engaged in the case study, such visualization is helpful in
understanding and analyzing the failure modes, instead of
studying information in the complex FMEA worksheets.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the background
of FMEA and the RPN model are explained. In Section 3, the
Euclidean similarity–based metric is formulated, and the use of
ETree in FMEA is described. In Section 4, the experimental results
are presented and discussed. Finally, concluding remarks are
provided in Section 5.
2. Preliminaries
To make this paper self-contained, the traditional RPN and
FIS-based RPN models are explained. The distance-based similarity
metric (Tay et al., 2015) is also reviewed.
2.1. Severity, occurrence, detection and risk priority number
Traditionally, FMEA adopts the RPN model, which considers
three risk factors, i.e., S, O, and D, for analyzing the failure modes
and prioritizing the corresponding actions. These three risk factors
form the input space, as follows.
Definition 1. An input space, i.e., S O D, is considered.
Variables s; o, and d are the elements of S, O, and D, respectively,
i.e., s 2 S, o 2 O, and d 2 D. The lower and upper boundaries of S is
represented by s and s, respectively. Similarly, the lower or upper
boundaries of O and D are represented by o and o, as well as d and
d, respectively.
A set of data samples in the S, O and D space, as defined in
Definition 1, i.e., s; o; d½ , is considered. Traditionally, the risk of
s; o; d½  is compared with those from other data samples in the
RPN space (i.e. the output space) according the following
definition.
Definition 2. The RPN space is the output space containing all
possible RPN scores. The lower and upper boundaries of the RPN
space is represented by RPN and RPN, respectively. The RPN space
follows a monotonic, ordered sequence, i.e., the higher the RPN
score, the higher the risk.2.2. The traditional RPN model
Traditionally, the RPN (output) score of an input s; o; d½  is
obtained using Eq. (1):
RPN ¼ s o d ð1Þ
Eq. (1) can be viewed as a mapping of ½s; o;d to the RPN space.
2.3. The Euclidean distance-based similarity metric
A set of failure modes as defined in Definition 3 is considered.
Note that each failure mode is represented by a data sample in
the input (S, O, and D) space.
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considered. Each failure mode is denoted as xk ¼ sk; ok; dk½  in the S,
O, and D space (Definition 1), k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., m.An Euclidean distance-based similarity metric for two failure
modes, i.e., xk ¼ sk; ok; dk½  and xj ¼ sj; oj; dj
 
; j, k = 1, 2, 3, . . ., m, is







ð2ÞFig. 2. The ETree learning algorithm for clustering and visualization of failure
modes in FMEA.3. The proposed methodology
In this section, the ETree model for FMEA application is
described in detail, as follows.
3.1. The evolving tree
Fig. 1 depicts the structure of ETree. The tree consists of a
total of nnode nodes. Each node is denoted as Nl;p, where
l ¼ 1;2;3; . . . ;nnode is the identity of a node, and p ¼ 0;1;2; . . . is
its parent node. As an example, the parent node of N2;1 is N1;0, or
N2;1 is a child node of N1;0. There are three types of nodes, i.e., a root
node, trunk nodes, and leaf nodes, Nleaf ; leaf 2 l. The root node is
the first node created in ETree (e.g., N1;0 in Fig. 1). It is located at
the top layer of the tree, and has no parent node (i.e., j ¼ 0). A trunk
node is a parent node (labelled as white in Fig. 1). A leaf node,
which is located at the bottom layer of a tree, has no child node
(labelled as black in Fig. 1). Each node is also attributed with a
weight vector (i.e., Wl ¼ wl;S;wl;O;wl;D
 
) and a Best Matched Unit
(BMU) hit counter (i.e., bl).
The root node and trunk nodes provide a series of paths con-
necting a leaf node to other leaf nodes. The tree distance of two leaf
nodes, i.e., Nl1 and Nl2 ; l1; l2 2 l, is denoted as dT Nl1 ;Nl2
 
. Note that
is determined by the number of trunk nodes (including the root
node) that connect and Nl2 at the shortest path. As an example,
dT N4;N7ð Þ ¼ 3, i.e., the number of trunk nodes connecting N4;2
and N7;3 through the shortest path is 3 (2 trunk nodes and the root
node). The tree size is measured by the number of nodes, i.e., nnode.
Based on the example in Fig. 1, the tree size is 9. The depth of a tree
is the number of layers, e.g. the depth of the tree in Fig. 1 is 4.
The ETree learning algorithm for clustering and visualization of
failure modes is depicted in Fig. 2. Each failure mode, i.e., xk, is pro-
vided to ETree for learning. There are three parameters that need to
be predefined before learning, i.e., epoch; hsplitting , and hchildnode.
Parameter epoch is the number of iterations, i.e., the number of
times xk; k ¼ 1;2;3; . . . ;m, should be learned. Parameter hsplitting is
the splitting threshold, which is also known as the tree growing
rate. Parameter hchildnode is the number of child nodes generated





Fig. 1. The structure of ETree.The important steps of ETree, as depicted in Fig. 2, are
explained, as follows.
Step1: Initialise the tree structure and provide a set of failure
modes. A root node is created with a weight vector of
W1 ¼ 111½ , and l ¼ nnode ¼ 1. Then, the failure modes,
xk;¼ 1;2;3; . . . ;m, are processed.
Step2: Set k ¼ 1.
Step3: Find the BMU for xk: xk is matched with the child nodes
of the root note using the Euclidean distance-based
metric (Eq. (2)). Euclidean Similarity xk; xj
 
is
obtained. The node with the highest score of
Euclidean Similarity xk; xj
 
is the BMU. If the BMU R leaf
nodes, xk is matched with the child nodes of the BMU
using the same manner, and the BMU is determined
among the child nodes again. If there are more
than one nodes with the same score of
Euclidean Similarity xk; xj
 
, the node with the largest
index is chosen. If the BMU 2 leaf nodes, it is NBMU .
Step4: Update the weight vectors of the leaf nodes. If nnode ¼ 1,
the root node is assumed to be the leaf node. The
Kohonen learning rule (Kohonen, 2001) is applied to
update the leaf nodes, i.e.,
START
END P5. Storing and Packaging 
P1. Swiftlets farming
M1. Facility maintenance 
P2. Harvesng 
M2. Tool maintenance 
P3. EBN cleaning 
M3. Tool maintenance 
P4. EBN drying and Reshaping 
M4. Tool and Facility 
maintenance 
Fig. 3. The process of EBN production (Jong et al., 2013).





 xk W l oldð Þð Þ ð3Þ
where / iterð Þ and r iterð Þ decrease monotonically as iter
increases. Update the bBMU counter, i.e., bBMU ¼ bBMU þ 1.Step5: Grow the tree, i.e., NBMU is split to hchildnode nodes. The
weight vectors of hchildnode nodes are cloned from NBMU .
Step6: Set k ¼ kþ 1.
Step7: Update the tree structure.
Step8: Set iter ¼ iter þ 1.
Step9: If iter 6 epoch, go to Step 2. Otherwise, end.
3.2. Risk interval of a cluster
In this paper, the risk associated with the failure modes in
each cluster is represented as a risk interval, i.e.,
RPNleaf ¼ RPNleaf ;RPNleaf
h i
. Eq. (1) is used to obtain the RPN score
of each xk pertaining to a cluster (i.e., k 2 Nleaf ), and is denoted as
RPN xkð Þ. The risk interval of Nleaf that contains a group of failure
modes is obtained using Eqs. (4) and (5).
RPNleaf ¼min RPN xkð Þ; where k 2 Nleaf
 
ð4Þ
RPNleaf ¼max RPN xkð Þ; where k 2 Nleaf
 
ð5Þ4. Experimental study
In this section, a series of experiments with real data/informa-
tion from the EBN industry in Sarawak, Borneo Island, is presented.
EBN (or known as ‘‘the Caviar of the East’’) is the nest of swiftlets,
which is consumed as a type of popular (healthy) food (Hobbs,
2004). With a high demand of EBN from China, swiftlets farming
and EBN processing have emerged as a major urban industry
among Southeast Asia countries, including Malaysia (Jordan,
2009; Lim, 2002). Note that Sarawak and Sabah (two states of
Malaysia in the Borneo Island) are the second resource area (after
Indonesia) of the world for EBN production (Hobbs, 2004; Lim,
2002). In general, the EBN production cycle consists of five pro-
cesses, i.e., swiftlets farming (P1), harvesting (P2), EBN cleaning
(P3), EBN drying and reshaping (P4), and storing and packaging
(P5) (Jong et al., 2013), as summarized in Fig. 3. The failure modes
associated with each sub-process need to be analyzed. In addition,
the failure modes for a number of tools and/or facilities used for
maintenance in the first four sub-processes (i.e., M1, M2, M3 and
M4 in Fig. 3) also need to be examined.
There are a total of 46 failure modes, denoted as xk ¼ sk; ok; dk½ ,
where k ¼ 1;2; . . . ;46 (i.e., m ¼ 46), for the entire EBN production
cycle, as summarised in Table 1. Column ‘‘Processes’’ indicates
the EBN production processes, i.e., from P1 to P5 and M1 to M4.
Column ‘‘Failure modes’’ indicates the label of each failure mode
(i.e., k) and its description. Columns sk; ok, and dk indicate the three
risk factors, i.e., S, O, and D.The scale tables of S, O, and D are presented in Tables 2–4,
respectively. In each scale table, column ‘‘Ranking’’ states the score
intervals. These intervals are tagged with a linguistic term, as in
column ‘‘Linguistic Term’’. A detailed description of each interval
is summarized in column ‘‘Description’’. As an example, an S score
from 1 to 2 is assigned with the linguistic term of ‘‘Very Low’’. This
interval is used to indicate a failure with a minor effect, which can
be ignored. Besides that, even if the failure occurs, the yield and the
product quality are still excellent.
In this paper, the failure modes are analyzed using the proposed
method in Section 3. To illustrate the usefulness of the Euclidean
similarity metric in measuring the similarity level of two failure
modes, the failure modes from two sub-processes, i.e., x14 to x26
in P3 and P4 (highlighted in Table 1), is exemplified in
Section 4.1. Besides that, all failure modes in Table 1 are clustered
and visualized with ETree as presented in Section 4.2. The param-
eters are empirically set as follows: hchildnode ¼ 2; epoch ¼ 5, and
hsplitting ¼ 10;20, and 30. The risk of each cluster of failure modes
is obtained based on its risk interval (Eqs. (4) and (5)) using the tra-
ditional RPN model. The clustering outcomes are then ordered and
ranked, as discussed in Section 4.3.
4.1. Similarity measures of two failure modes
Consider the comparison between x3 and x39, where x3 is
½10 1 1 and x39 is 1 10 1½ , as shaded in Table 1. Using Eq. (1), the
RPN scores of both x3 and x39 are 10; however, they have different
combinations of S, O, and D. Both x3 and x39 share the same D score,
i.e., 1 (excellent detection). However, x3 is associated with S¼ 10
(i.e., potentially lead to product safety and quality) and O = 1 (i.e.,
happen at least once ever). x39 is associated with S = 1 (i.e., effects
of the potential failure mode is not obvious and can be ignored)
and O¼10 (i.e., happen many times within an hour). With the
Euclidean distance-based similarity metric (i.e., Eq. (2)), their sim-
ilarity measure is 0.1835. This implies that even though both fail-
ure modes are associated with the same RPN score, they can be
differentiated by the similarity metric. Such metric is useful for
clustering and visualization of failure modes. As such, it is useful
for solving a key issue of risk ranking in FMEA, i.e., different com-
binations of S, O, and D produce the same RPN scores.
4.2. Visualization with ETree
In this section, visualization with ETree as a result of the
Euclidean distance-based metric is presented. To simplify the dia-
gram, the nodes, i.e., Nl;p, are indexed as l. Fig. 4 depicts the tree
structure with hsplitting ¼ 30, while Figs. 5 and 6 depict the tree
structures with hsplitting ¼ 20, and 10, respectively. As shown in
Fig. 4, the failure modes are clustered into thirteen nodes. The
nodes located at the lower layers describe the detailed information
in FMEA. As an example, the weight vector of
N12;4 2:0209 5:8461 1:0002½ ð Þ is associated with three unique fail-
ure modes, i.e., 1 10 1½ ; 2 6 1½ , and 2 5 1½ . N13;4, which is located
next to N12;4 in the tree, has the weight vector of
Table 1
Failure modes of the EBN production process.
Table 2




1–2 Very low  Effect of the potential failure mode is not obvious
and can be ignored
 Excellent yield and product quality
3–4 Low  Very minor impact to the production yield
 Failures cause a minor impact to EBN food pro-
duction process control. The consequence will
cause a minor effect to the products’ cosmetic
appearance and packaging
5–7 Medium  Failures lead to the issue of minor security
breaches of the farm, habitat of the swiftlets is
affected by some of the pests and enemies of
the swiftlets. The consequence will cause a reduc-
tion in the population of the swiftlets and the
yield of the farm
 Failures cause a minor impact to the production
yield
8–9 High  Failures lead to the issue of serious security
breaches of the farm. Safety of the swiftlets will
be threatened by its enemies, such as thieves
and predators
 Failures cause a major impact to the production
yield
10 Very High  Failures lead to impacts to product safety and
quality
 Compliance to law
 Major impact to the reputation of the company
and the products
 Lead to failure to yield management
7240 W.L. Chang et al. / Expert Systems with Applications 42 (2015) 7235–72443:7196 6:5797 1:0203½ , and is associated with six unique failure
modes. i.e., 4 9 1½ ; 4 6 2½ ; 3 10 1½ ; 4 10 1½ ; 3 7 1½ , and 4 6 1½ .
Referring to Tables 2–4, node N12;4 compresses the failure modes
pertaining to the S score from 1 to 2 (i.e., effects of the potential
failure mode is not obvious and can be ignored, with excellent
yield and product quality), the O score from 5 to 10 (i.e., occurs
more than at least once within 1 to 6 months.), and the D scoreof 1 (i.e., excellent detection). Node N13;4 compresses the failure
modes with the S score from 3 to 4 (i.e., have very minor impact
to the production yield and cause minor effect to the products’
cosmetic appearance and packaging), the O score from 6 to 10
(i.e., occurs more than at least once within 1 to 6 months.), and
the D score of 1 (i.e., excellent detection). N12;4 and N13;4 are the
child nodes of N4;2, while the weight vector of N4;2 is the same as
that of N13;4. As such, it is clear that the parent nodes represent
more general information pertaining to the failure modes while
their child nodes represent more specific or detailed information
about the failure modes in FMEA.
The results can also be displayed in a three-dimensional (S, O,
and D) space in accordance with Definition 1, as shown in Fig. 7.
To allow a clear visualization, the failure modes are labelled with
l. In Fig. 7, the failure modes mapped onto N12;4 (labelled as 12)
and N13;4 (labelled as 13) comprise xk; k ¼ 39;40;42;45;46, and
xk; k ¼ 14;15;16;17;28;36, respectively. These failure modes have
the closest distance measurement in the Cartesian space. Such
method allows the failure modes with different combinations of
S, O and D but the same RPN score to be clustered and visualized.
Referring to Figs. 4 and 7, x3 (i.e., ½10 1 1) and x39 (i.e., ½1 10 1)
have the same RPN score (i.e., 10), and they belong to N9;6 and
N12;4, respectively. Using the traditional RPN model (Eq. (1)), both
x3 and x39 have the same risk level; therefore they should have
the same level of importance or priority. However, it should be
noted that x3 is associated with S¼10 (i.e., potentially lead to pro-
duct safety and quality) and O = 1 (i.e., happen at least once ever)
while x39 is associated with S = 1 (i.e., effects of the potential failure
mode is not obvious and can be ignored) and O = 10 (i.e., happen
many times within an hour). As such, both failure modes should
have different prioritization actions in practice. By using ETree,
these two failure modes (although having the same RPN score)
are grouped into two different clusters. This outcome indicates that
ETree is able to differentiate both failure modes so that FMEA users
can prioritize different actions to overcome each failure mode
Table 3






 Failures happen at least once ever
2–3 Very Low  Failures happen at least once within 6 to
12 months
4–5 Low  Failures happen at least once within 1 to
6 months
6–7 Medium  Failures happen at least once within 1 to 30 days
8–9 High  Failures happen at least once within 1 to 8 work-
ing hours (1 day)
10 Very High  Failures happen many times within an hour
Table 4




1–3 Very High Detection is excellent
 Control actions can almost detect the failure on
the spot and appropriate actions are taken to
solve the failure and the weakness
 Prevent the excursion from occurring
4–6 High Detection is good
 Control actions can almost detect the failure on
the spot within the same process module or steps
 In farm management, control actions can detect
the failure within one day
 Appropriate actions are available to solve the fail-
ure and the weakness
7–8 Medium Detection is acceptable
 Control actions can detect the failure within one
to two process modules or steps
 In farm management, control actions can detect
the failure within one to three days
 Appropriate actions are available. However the
failure can be tricky and hard to solve
9 Low Hard to detect
 Control actions may not detect the failure
 Appropriate actions may not be available and the
failure cannot be solved
10 Very Low Detection is almost impossible
 No control action is available
 No solution is available for solving the failure
Fig. 4. The tree model at hsplitting ¼ 30.
Fig. 5. The tree model with hsplitting ¼ 20.
Fig. 6. The tree model with hsplitting ¼ 10.
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their Euclidean similarity metric (0.1835), whereby they are
located far apart in the input (S, O, and D) space, as shown in
Fig. 7. Besides that, x3 belongs to the same group of x1; x2; x5; x6x7;
x8; x9; x11; x29; x30; x32, and x33, with relatively high similarity
measures, i.e., ranging from 0.3585 to 0.9358. On the other hand,
x39 belongs to the same group of x40; x42; x45, and x46, with high sim-
ilarity measures too, i.e., ranging from 0.6729 to 0.7355. This
observation highlights the usefulness of ETree coupled with the
Euclidean similarity metric to differentiate failure modes into dis-
tinctive clusters that can be visualized easily by FMEA users for
decision making, e.g. allowing different prioritization actions to
be taken.
As expected, different hsplitting settings lead to different tree
structures, as depicted in Figs. 4–6. A smaller hsplitting results in a lar-
ger and more detailed tree structure. Table 5 shows the overall
comparison among different tree structures with different hsplitting
settings, i.e., in terms of the tree size, tree depth, and number of
leaf nodes. A discussion with FMEA users engaged in this case
study indicated that hsplitting ¼ 30 provided the best clustering and
visualization outcome, whereby all forty-six failure modes could
be visualized easily as seven clusters for decision making purposes.4.3. Risk interval and ordering analysis
The ETree model enables the risks of failure modes to be
ordered and analyzed. Specifically, the clusters of failure modes
are ordered, and the risk intervals are analyzed. Table 6 summa-
rizes the risk intervals of failure modes with hsplitting ¼ 30. Column
l indicates the cluster label. Columns wl;S;wl;O, and wl;D indicate
the elements of the weight vector, i.e., wl;Swl;Owl;D
 
. The risk inter-
val of each cluster is summarized in columns RPNl and RPNl. As an
example, in Table 6, N7;3 with the weight vector of
8:778405 1:000083 7:368034½  is associated with an risk interval
of 90 90½ .
From Table 6, notice that RPN12;RPN12
h i
¼ 10;12½  and
RPN13;RPN13
 
¼ 21;48½ . As such, the risk associated with N12;4 is
within the risk interval of N13;4. Besides that, RPN7;RPN7
 
¼
90;90½ , and RPN8;RPN8
 
¼ 1;24½ . This means that the risk
Fig. 7. Clustering outcomes of identical failure modes in the S, O, and D space with
hsplitting ¼ 30.
Table 5
Comparison of the tree size, tree depth and number of clusters with different hsplitting
settings.
hsplitting Tree size Tree depth Number of clusters (leaf nodes)
30 13 4 7
20 17 5 9
10 33 7 17
7242 W.L. Chang et al. / Expert Systems with Applications 42 (2015) 7235–7244associated with N7;3=N11;5 is higher than that of N8;6, i.e.,
N8;6 < N7;3=N11;5. It can also be observed that N8;6 < N9;6 < N13;4 <
N7;3=N11;5. The results in Table 6 suggest that the failure modes in
N7;3=N11;5 have higher risks than those in N13;4, and then follow
by those in N9;6 and N8;6.
It is evident that the ETree model allows failure modes to be
ordered and interpreted as a group, instead of interpreting each
failure mode individually. This is useful for FMEA users to have a
relatively simple ordering outcome, which can be visualized
quickly. Instead of ordering all forty-six failure modes, only seven
clusters of failure modes need to be ordered after clustering. The
results show that the priority should be given to N11;5 and N7;3,
which comprise failure modes of x18; x19; x20; x21; x22; x23;
x24; x25; x26, and x31, with the risk intervals of 84;128½  and
90;90½ , respectively. From Fig. 7, failure modes in N11;5 and N7;3 fall
in different regions of the input space, and can hardly be grouped
together owing to different implications. However, it is important
to identify both groups of failure modes because they have the
highest risk intervals. In short, the ETree model can identify the
failure modes with high risks with different implications, and
categorise them into different groups for decision making.
4.4. Computational times
In this paper, a laptop equipped with Intel (R) Core (TM) i7–
3612QM @3.10 GHz and 4.0 GB of RAM was used for theTable 6
Risk interval analysis of failure modes with hsplitting ¼ 30.
l wl;S wl;O wl;D RP
7 8.778405 1.000083 7.368034 90
8 1.826295 3.549084 2.637303 1
9 5.505737 1.034637 3.918611 5
10 1.305596 5.318108 3.071625 15
11 3.817895 7.01255 3.981091 84
12 2.020925 5.84615 1.000247 10
13 3.719644 6.579667 1.020294 21experimental study. The computational times required for
hsplitting ¼ 10;20, and 30 were 0.9933, 0.2744 and 0.1531 s, respec-
tively, i.e., less than one second for each hsplitting setting. In short, the
proposed ETree model could generate its tree structure with a low
computational requirement.4.5. Remarks
This empirical study demonstrates that the failure modes in
FMEA can be easily visualized with ETree, which leads to the fol-
lowing advantages. Firstly, the failure modes captured in a com-
plex FMEA worksheet can be represented in a tree structure,
whereby the failure modes within the same node share a higher
similarity measure than those from other nodes. From the feedback
of the FMEA users engaged in this case study, the tree structures
are useful for visualizing and analyzing the associated failure
modes, which result in more effective and efficient prioritization
actions and decision making. Secondly, based on the information
and knowledge elucidated from the tree structures, understanding
the entire FMEA problem with a large number of failure modes and
a complex FMEA worksheet can be made feasible within a short
period of time, as acknowledged by the FMEA users of this case
study. These advantages directly mitigate the challenging issues
related to practical implementation of FMEA, i.e., complex FMEA
worksheets and intricacy of use as highlighted in Montgomery
et al. (1996), Signor (2002). From the discussion with the FMEA
users engaged in the case study, the failure modes captured in a
tree structure can be understood quickly and effectively, as com-
pared with the information in a complex FMEA worksheet.
In addition to the above two advantages, the tree structure pro-
vides a hierarchy of layers that represents the failure modes with
increasing details when the FMEA users transverse down the layers
in the tree. This property allows the FMEA users to choose an alter-
native solution pertaining to the nodes at a higher layer, instead of
only at the leaf nodes. Choosing clustering outcomes at a higher
layer provides a set of more general prioritization actions as com-
pared with that from a lower layer. Conversely, choosing clustering
outcomes at a lower layer provides a set of detailed prioritization
actions. Such property is useful as it provides options for the
FMEA users to plan their prioritization actions subject to the avail-
able resources.5. Summary
In this paper, an ETree model has been proposed to solve two
well-known shortcomings in FMEA, i.e., complicated FMEA work-
sheet and intricacy of use. The proposed model has been evaluated
comprehensively using a case study with real EBN information. The
ETree has shown its usefulness for clustering the S, O, and D scores,
and analyzing the failure modes in groups. The characteristics and
relationship among the failure modes or prioritization actions can
be visualized in a tree structure. The failure modes in groups can
also be easily analyzed and ordered by using the proposed risk
interval and risk ordering equations.Nl RPNl Failure modes
90 x31
24 x4; x10 ; x12; x13; x27; x34; x35; x38; x41, and x44
36 x1; x2; x3; x5; x6; x7; x8; x9; x11; x29; x30; x32, and x33
36 x37, and x43
128 x18 ; x19; x20; x21; x22; x23; x24; x25, and x26
12 x39 ; x40; x42; x45, and x46
48 x14 ; x15; x16; x17; x28, and x36
W.L. Chang et al. / Expert Systems with Applications 42 (2015) 7235–7244 7243There are two main contributions of this study. From the per-
spective of intelligent systems, this study contributes toward a
new application of the ETree model, i.e., FMEA. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first attempt to use the ETree model in
FMEA applications with real information in the literature. From
the perspective of FMEA, this study contributes toward a new com-
puting technique for tackling two existing shortcomings of FMEA.
To complement the ETree model in FMEA, the ideas of risk interval
and risk ordering for analyzing the failure modes in groups have
also been introduced. These notions are useful for clustering and
visualization problems, as they allow failure modes to be grouped
and ordered. Specifically, we have demonstrated a practical exam-
ple on the use of risk interval and risk ordering, coupled with
ETree, to allow both visualization and ordering of failure modes
in groups in the EBN case study.
The proposed ETree model suffers from a number of limitations
too. Firstly, it is difficult to have an accurate visualization of the
failure modes without the consensus from the FMEA users with dif-
ferent expertise levels. Besides that, the ETree model requires a few
new parameters to be pre-determined. As such, the trial-and-error
method is required to obtain the preferred tree structure.
For further research, other visualization modalities, e.g., graph-
ical effects (size, color, shape), text labels, and hierarchical maps,
can be examined for visualizing the failure modes in FMEA effec-
tively. The use of other clustering models, e.g., the SOM network
(Kohonen, 2001) and self-organizing tree (Campos & Carpenter,
2001), for visualization of the failure modes or prioritization
actions can be investigated too. Potential applications of other
types of neural network learning paradigms, e.g., supervised, rein-
forcement, and/or semi-supervised learning, for FMEA applications
can be studied. Visualization of the failure modes with fuzzy S, O,
and D (also known as linguistic S, O, and D) measurements consti-
tutes another area for further research.Acknowledgements
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